China appears to be playing the long game in pursuit of its interests in the Indo-Pacific. In this series of Strategist articles, Joe Keary, Raji Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen discuss how China is pursuing its regional ambitions by normalising its presence. Drawing from a series of war games ASPI hosted in March that ‘explored how China’s defence and security agencies might extend influence out to 2036,’ the authors analyse what Beijing’s campaign could mean for regional stability moving forward.
According to the authors, China’s aim is not to ‘displace the United States or its partners overnight,’ but rather to gradually shift the regional status quo. This strategy is built around naval modernisation, grey-zone tactics and a layered, multi-force coercion toolkit. Australia and its partners should be aware of this pattern so it can better respond to China’s activities.
For Australia and its partners, the challenge is not simply responding to individual Chinese activities but understanding how they fit into a broader pattern of gradual expansion. A port visit here, a survey mission there, a new security agreement with a Pacific Island state –each may seem manageable in isolation. But together they point to a long-term effort to shift the balance of presence and influence across the Indo-Pacific.
As a key aspect of its campaign, Beijing will likely continue trying to normalise its military presence in the region. As well as increased military activity, the authors suggest that this normalisation could include a greater frequency of resupply and medical visits to regional ports; a more regular presence of ‘surveillance and intelligence ships, falsely called research vessels’; the inclusion of naval and intelligence functions in dual-use logistics facilities; and a larger role for the China Coast Guard.
China’s presence in seas and ports far from its coast is becoming routine. The frequency of its appearances has been rising for about a decade. Now it’s approaching a point where China’s military presence has become normal and expected, not aggressive.
This is another example of China’s familiar tactic of salami slicing, seen also, for example, in its progressive attempts at dominating the South China Sea: it takes a little, then a little more, and hopes eventually to have the whole salami.
Despite a lack of deliberate aggression, China’s attempts to normalise its presence may still lead to escalation, the authors say. As Chinese naval activity becomes more common in Indo-Pacific waters, regional powers may also increase their operations in response. This increases the risk of incidents, therefore raising the likelihood of escalation. Australia and its partners will need to ‘operate effectively in this environment while limiting the risks that come with it.’
Across all three regions, the pattern will be consistent. China will build presence incrementally and regional actors will respond through surveillance, partnerships and operational activity. The greatest danger lies in cumulative friction. Individual incidents may be manageable, but repeated interactions will increase the likelihood that one is misinterpreted or escalates beyond initial intent. This will be a particular issue when trust is limited and communication channels are underdeveloped.
While China is moving slowly now, there are signs that it may yet accelerate its outward push. Deterrence may be enough to counter Beijing’s quiet expansion. But according to the authors, an accelerated Chinese campaign would require Australia and other regional powers to also adopt a more active strategy.
Partnership building, domestic resilience and sustained regional engagement will be critical to shaping outcomes. Persistent presence, intelligence sharing, joint exercises and operational interoperability will need to grow to manage risk and maintain influence in an increasingly contested environment.
