They were assembled in Australia but not really made in Australia. Lockheed Martin GMLRS missiles lately test-fired in Australia were the first delivered from an Australian factory, and the 13 April announcement of the shots is a milestone worth celebrating. But at this early stage the Australian production process for GMLRS surface-to-surface rounds is still only the putting together of parts imported from the United States.
End-to-end production for various types of missiles in Australia is the goal. Having a self-reliant missile-making capability means being able to sustain, adapt and replenish in times of pressure, which demands the sharing of fabrication technology, implementation of full manufacturing capability, and skills transfer to Australia. At present, if the US supply fails, so does the Australian assembly line for GMLRS (pronounced ‘Gimmlers’).
The Australian Defence Force’s access to missiles is improved only slightly by the assembly activity done at Lockheed Martin’s new plant at Port Wakefield, South Australia. The key benefit is that Australia is beginning to help build up global industrial capability for GMLRS. Assembly is also a toe in the door in building trust with the US for licensing and deeper technology-sharing in the future.
GMLRS is a ground-battle weapon, an artillery rocket that has an officially stated range of 70 km and is mostly launched from Himars trucks. Typical targets include enemy force concentrations, command posts and supply dumps. Beyond GMLRS, Australia is looking to build much more sophisticated missiles, such as PRSM and hypersonic weapons.
Deeper Australian manufacturing of GMLRS itself is intended. In the announcement of the test shots (dates for which weren’t disclosed) Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy said, ‘Australian suppliers will be progressively introduced into the GMLRS supply chain thanks to the … government’s A$320 million commitment to uplift local companies to manufacture GMLRS components.’
Nonetheless, Australia is so far receiving only limited production techonology under the GMLRS arrangement with Lockheed Martin, because of US government restrictions. Washington strictly controls its missile technologies, particularly those for seekers and guidance. Even following the precedent of AUKUS technology sharing agreements, advanced missile technologies remain on the exclusions list.
Aiming at deeper technology sharing, Australia has so far secured an agreement to produce some GMLRS components beginning in 2029. This will be the next step in building industrial depth, though it is unclear which parts these would be. If controls on technology sharing don’t change, Australia will always rely on importing the systems that give GMLRS its high accuracy.
Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosives Ordnance plan was that local manufacturing would ensure the ADF’s missile supplies. With most of our missiles being acquired from the US, Australia has high single-source dependency. But opening a Lockheed Martin assembly line in Australia has not addressed this.
Australia will need much more control over the supply chain to secure ADF access to missiles; it will also need large production capacity. Self-reliance demands diversification of missile types in domestic production and use of a variety of supply chains to avoid dependence on a single foreign source.
Australia’s planned solution is to develop a domestic capability to make every component required for any missile type it puts into domestic production, which is hindered by restrictive technology sharing agreements. Since missile types can use widely different components, an ability to do this for one doesn’t necessarily imply an ability to do it for others. But it does imply the strengthening of technical skills and knowledge that ease barriers to broader production.
Australia can make domestic manufacturing and technology transfer a condition of its procurements. Poland did this in 2023 when it agreed to buy CAMM anti-aircraft and anti-missile missiles from the Anglo-French-Italian company MBDA. It gained sufficient rights to make the missiles and their launchers domestically. A December 2025 agreement between South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace and Poland’s WB Electronics will lead to Polish production of the Chunmoo CGR-080 (which is very similar to GMLRS), building what Polish Deputy Prime Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz refers to as their ambition for ‘production independence’. Deliveries are due to begin in 2030.
The Australian government is clearly aware that these partnerships are possible. Australia’s deal with Norwegian company Kongsberg for NSM and JSM strike missiles will deliver technology sharing and industrial depth which will allow for sustainment in Australia. The production facility at Newcastle will exactly replicate an advanced new Kongsberg plant in Norway. While it will also begin as an assembly station, it is planned to produce priority components, assemble, and maintain missiles of both types by 2028. In addition, BAE Systems Australia has the contract for supplying sensor technology for the globally, and, with support from German maunfacturer TDW, Australia may also make the warhead for NSM and JSM.
When Australia makes all components for a missile, it has more control over the timing and volume of production. It need not await foreign supplies or approvals. Within the limits of its budget and local factory capacity, it can feed its armed forces as it needs to. The question is whether Australia will keep making large exceptions to this ideal, as it’s doing with GMLRS.
