A rules-based world order guaranteed by a collective of middle powers is possible if leaders confidently choose to strengthen military, diplomatic and economic levers of sovereign power. These countries, largely major developed economies, must diversify their relationships to mobilise the power of others and reduce vulnerability to coercion. And they won’t be able to lead the rules-based order unless they become much more assertive in defending it.
They are already doing some of what is needed—but not enough, and not with conviction.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s 20 January speech called for middle powers to collaborate in shaping a new order. But coverage of the speech has yet to challenge its central premise: is a cooperative, just and resilient world, one not subordinate to superpowers, possible?
His vision seeks to uphold international institutions and rules while relying on networked multilateralism to avoid a bipolar system dominated by China and the United States. While some may critique this on the basis of superpowers’ sheer power, the premise has credibility among scholars and world leaders. The fundamental premise is to create an ecosystem of relationships rather than an arrangement with a single point of failure or reliance.
Middle powers have shown they can leverage defence diplomacy and moderate economic pressure in coalition to exert a force multiplying effect that changes cost calculations for great powers. For example, the European Union’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—including military assistance and investment, as well as diversifying supply chains—has hindered Russia’s strategic success.
In the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s fast-tracked military modernisation increases regional strength. It also demonstrates that we don’t have to eliminate integration with superpowers to begin decreasing reliance. With the support of other partners, such as France, this region is further strengthened in terms of deterrence and decreases its vulnerability to coercion.
With the real risk of nuclear escalation in militarised conflict, tools of power have shifted beyond basic military computations. An ability to resist coercion—based on strong economic resilience and technological capabilities—is a substantive indicator of power. To build this strength, states are avoiding reliance on imports that have a stranglehold on security, instead spending on domestic capability in not just defence, but energy and technology as well.
France, India, Canada, Germany, Japan, Indonesia and Australia are considered relatively strong economic and military powers, suggesting potential for effective collective strength. Diversity of partnerships across regions with complimentary industrial and technological collaboration will help resist coercion by one or another superpower.
There is a real risk of splintering and disintegrating our international institutions if they are not funded and insisted upon. Without US underwriting and hegemonic influence, middle powers must invest financially and politically in the United Nations and its agencies for collective security. Middle powers must be ready to apply international rules and hold states accountable—as European states have done in the case of the US’s attempt to take over Greenland.
But it must be consistent and confident. In the South China sea, no effective multilateral response has arisen, despite the Philippines’ transparency initiative. The ability to project and shape geopolitical norms internationally is the litmus test of power and influence.
In a world already shifted, Australia must confront reality and navigate the inevitable risk with clear vision and conviction. Given Australia’s position—caught between two superpowers, one its largest trading partner and the other its security guarantor—it has an interest in actively shaping conditions for global security and faces the biggest challenge in navigating detangling itself.
Australia must shift from a nostalgic and timid defence policy to actively shaping a cooperative, rules-based order. This requires high risk tolerance, long-term vision and integrated foreign and defence policy. Australia should accelerate building up its defence capability, diversify partnerships beyond reliance on one ally, assess economic and technological vulnerabilities, resist the false choice between China and the US, and communicate its strategy clearly and consistently to build trust and stability.
While there will be challenges and risks, there is a path for middle powers to lead a new world order. In any case, a fractured, highly armed world, devoid of diplomatic power and dictated by two major powers is not an appealing alternative. The probability of achieving Carney’s vision lies in individual and collective strength, which depends on commitment to a shared vision—which is not guaranteed.
