Meetings between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) are now routine, no longer tentative or discreet but frequent and increasingly public. From 7 to 12 April 2026, KMT chair Cheng Li-wun is taking that engagement a step further, travelling to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping – the first leader-level meeting between the two parties since 2015.
This meeting is best understood as a political demonstration and a form of political influence. For the KMT, which has lost Taiwan’s past three presidential elections, it is a chance to show it remains relevant. For the CCP, it is an opportunity to shape Taiwan’s domestic political environment while advancing the argument that unification can still be pursued without force.
The risks are significant. Party-to-party diplomacy cuts across Taiwan’s democratic system, where cross-strait policy is formally the responsibility of the elected government. A high-level meeting in Beijing risks creating parallel channels of authority and undermining policy coherence. It also deepens domestic polarisation.
The historical backdrop also makes this relationship striking. The CCP and KMT were once adversaries in a civil war that ended with both combatants standing. For decades, each denied the other’s legitimacy. Yet in recent decades, they are engaging directly, speaking the language of ‘peaceful development’ and ‘shared culture’, and doing so in a way that deliberately bypasses Taiwan’s elected government – with which Beijing refuses to engage because it is led by the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
The pattern has been building for some time. In 2025, the KMT and organisations linked to former KMT president Ma Ying-jeou sent at least nine delegations to China, seven more than in 2024. These exchanges normalised contact, reactivated dormant channels and established a rhythm of engagement. A meeting between Xi and Cheng is the culmination of that process, elevating party-to-party ties to a level that begins to resemble leader-level diplomacy, even if it sits outside formal state structures.
At the centre of this relationship is a carefully managed ambiguity. Both sides nominally adhere to the concept of One China but interpret it in fundamentally incompatible ways. For Beijing, it implies eventual unification under CCP rule. For the KMT, it remains a flexible framework that in practice preserves the Republic of China, as Taiwan is formally named. This ambiguity allows dialogue to proceed without resolving the core dispute.
For the KMT, the political logic is clear. After extended time in opposition, the party faces a credibility problem. It needs to show voters that it is not just historically significant but politically useful. It’s using engagement with Beijing to make that case, showing that it can talk to China, manage tensions and reduce the risk of conflict.
A meeting with Xi is central to the pitch. It signals access at the highest level and allows the KMT to present itself as an indispensable interlocutor – particularly at a time when Beijing refuses to communicate with the DPP government. In effect, the party is attempting to convert diplomatic access into domestic political capital.
For the CCP, the calculation is more strategic. Beijing’s preference has consistently been to achieve unification without war if possible. Military coercion remains central, but it is not the only pathway. Engagement with the KMT fits into a broader strategy that combines pressure with inducement, but also political influence.
By elevating party-to-party ties, the CCP is not simply keeping a non-military pathway open; it is actively trying to shape Taiwan’s political landscape. A high-profile meeting with Cheng Li-wun allows Beijing to signal which political actors it considers acceptable interlocutors, while continuing to isolate the DPP government. This is political signalling with intent: rewarding engagement, marginalising resistance and influencing how Taiwan’s voters perceive their options.
This approach aligns with a broader pattern in Beijing’s Taiwan strategy. Coercive pressure has intensified across military, economic and diplomatic domains. But it is paired with selective engagement directed at actors willing to operate within Beijing’s limits. Taken together, this is not just pressure; it is a coordinated effort to shape Taiwan’s internal politics.
There is also a constraint that neither side can fully control: Taiwan’s public opinion. Over the past decade, Taiwanese national identity has strengthened and scepticism towards Beijing has deepened, particularly as military pressure has increased. This places limits on how far external influence can translate into political support.
For the KMT, this creates a narrow operating space. The party needs to show that engagement delivers tangible benefits, but it must avoid the perception that it is enabling Beijing’s agenda. Demonstrating relevance without appearing dependent is a difficult balance.
For Beijing, the challenge is different. Its strategy depends on influencing Taiwan’s political trajectory without triggering backlash. If engagement is perceived as interference – that is, as an attempt to shape electoral outcomes or legitimise preferred political actors – it risks hardening resistance rather than softening it.
The political effects of this engagement will ultimately be tested at the ballot box. Taiwan’s 2026 municipal elections will provide only a partial signal. Voters in these contests tend to prioritise local issues – housing, infrastructure and service delivery – over cross-strait policy, so the KMT is unlikely to receive a clear endorsement of its engagement strategy.
The real test will come in the 2028 presidential election, in which cross-strait relations will sit at the centre of political debate. By then, voters will be making a more direct choice between competing approaches: engagement versus deterrence. For the KMT, the meeting of Xi and Cheng is intended to demonstrate relevance and competence. For the DPP, it reinforces the case that Beijing’s outreach is not neutral but instrumental, aimed at shaping Taiwan’s politics in service of unification.
A Xi–Cheng meeting therefore reflects convergence, but not resolution. The KMT is seeking to prove it still matters. The CCP is seeking to prove that force is not yet necessary and that Taiwan’s future can be influenced from within.
Both may succeed in the short term. But the longer-term outcome will be determined not in Beijing, but by how Taiwan’s electorate responds to what increasingly looks like external political interference. That remains the decisive variable.
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