Defence Minister Richard Marles today announced the government’s new National Defence Strategy (NDS) and its accompanying spending outline, the Integrated Investment Plan (IIP).
This is Australia’s second NDS. The first, released in 2024, outlined Australia’s strategy of denial. This included investment in capabilities able to hold adversaries at risk from a distance, such as nuclear-powered submarines, new surface warships and long-range strike. This year’s strategy builds on that, but shows clear signs of evolution.
ASPI analysts provide their views on the contents of the 2026 NDS, what has changed since the 2024 strategy, and what it could mean for Australian defence and security.
Mike Hughes, director, Defence Strategy program
The 2026 NDS demonstrates the government’s understanding that the deterioration of our strategic environment has intensified since 2024. The strategy is an evolution, not a revolution. This reflects that the transformation of the Australian Defence Force and our concept of national defence is a long-term endeavour that won’t be achieved in a two-year cycle.
This strategy correctly places greater emphasis on balancing our US alliance with a need for increasing self-reliance. In addition to the critical geopolitical balancing role the US provides against other great powers, the US alliance gives us access to unique intelligence, technology, industry and capability that are vital inputs in our pursuit of self-reliance. This in turn gives life to our desire for greater autonomy and makes us a more valuable partner to those middle powers we increasingly seek to align ourselves with. However, determining whether the government’s claimed investments are enough to realise the full potential of the strategy will require further analysis.
Courtney Stewart, deputy director, Defence Strategy program
Australia’s new NDS reflects a strategic environment marked by ambiguity, discontinuity and the weaponisation of economic and technological dependencies. It’s an evolution that sharpens Australia’s strategy of denial and places a premium on self-reliance. At its core, the strategy recognises that deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is not about preventing invasion but about shaping the balance of power by raising the costs of coercion by deterring from greater distance. This demands an ADF capable of holding adversaries at risk at range.
But self-reliance does not mean autonomy. The US alliance remains indispensable, providing the intelligence, technological edge and capability access that underpin Australia’s ability to contribute meaningfully to that regional balance. Despite the ambitions of middle powers, a favourable balance of power requires a great power on our side.
Overall, self-reliance will require Australia to shoulder greater responsibility for its own defence and for deterring coercion. The pace of change to achieve ADF military requirements will remain the critical challenge of implementing this strategy.
Richard Gray, resident senior fellow
There is a strong continuity between the 2026 NDS and its predecessor. On the whole, this is positive, as achieving strategic goals is most likely when there is continuity in policy over time. There is again a welcome focus on seeking self-reliance in the context of the US alliance, which may give us more autonomy, and would make us a more useful security partner. But there’s relatively little new money, despite the NDS’s recognition that the security environment is deteriorating.
Malcolm Davis, senior analyst
The 2026 IIP highlights greater investment into semi-autonomous uncrewed systems, including the Ghost Bat jet aircraft and Ghost Shark submarine. This will allow the ADF to boost mass and combat capability but at reduced cost compared with acquiring crewed platforms. That’s a good move.
Targeting and long-range strike is also a priority, with Australia intending to develop long-range hypersonic weapons. Also significant is a prioritisation of land-based strike capabilities, including the Precision Strike Missile, with a goal to extend reach past 1,000 km.
A decision to provide greater assurance of investment, specifically doubling spending on integrated air and missile defence, is a welcome one. But more clarity is needed on when effectors – ground-based interceptors – will be acquired.
Finally, the strategy demonstrates a greater sense of urgency around acquiring counter-drone capabilities, including by increasing spending. This is a good change, given the threat of low-cost armed drones such as Shahed-type systems now being used in Iran and Ukraine. Counter-drone technology complements IAMD to protect vital northern infrastructure and expeditionary ADF forces deployed to support deterrence by denial.
Colin Karotam, resident senior fellow
The new NDS and IIP remind us again that we are living in an increasingly dangerous region and uncertain world. But the fact that there is more rigour and regularity in the strategy design process should give us some comfort. Our changing strategic circumstances, technological developments and lessons from other conflicts are now rolled into a structured consideration of Defence’s ends, ways and means every two years. That’s a good thing.
Madi Jones, analyst
The NDS outlines the need to hold adversaries at risk at long range. The strategy and IIP highlight that Australia’s targeting and long-range strike capability is critical to achieving this. There is particular emphasis on building strike capabilities in the maritime domain, which is consistent with the focus on holding adversaries at risk beyond our immediate territory and on contributing to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.
The strategy also discusses maintaining access to the capability and technology that the US alliance and industrial base provide our defence force, while at the same time recognising the increasingly urgent need for self-reliance. As Australia seeks to further develop long-range strike capabilities, the focus will be on the speed of capability delivery. The challenge will be navigating the balance between procuring from the US (which is facing industrial strain), pursuing truly open tender with alternative partners for similar capabilities and building Australia’s own production capacity.
Linus Cohen, researcher
The government’s new defence spending target of 3 percent of GDP by 2033 has a nice ring to it. The figure, calculated using NATO’s bespoke metric, can be read cynically – it certainly makes the number look bigger – but on the whole, it’s neither unreasonable nor fundamentally deceptive. NATO’s metric focuses on the burden that defence places on society. Military pensions won’t sink a ship or shoot down a drone, but they are undeniably part of the cost society owes for keeping and using the means to defend itself.
More to the point, GDP ratios being the blunt instruments they are, if you’re going to use them at all, you might as well try for consistency. Marles’s statement that Australia is already outspending most of NATO, if you look at the GDP ratio calculated with NATO’s own metric, is correct. Defence burdens Australian society about as much as Finland’s armed forces burden theirs. But whether in either case that’s value for money, or whether the military and civil economies are in a good and sustainable balance, is something the ratio won’t tell you.
Raelene Lockhorst, deputy director, National Security Programs
The 2024 NDS implicitly elevated the Defence estate as critical operational infrastructure supporting forward posture and survivability in Australia’s northern approaches. The 2026 Defence Estate Audit reinforced this shift, testing whether infrastructure supports force posture, readiness and sustainment, and signalling that assets must demonstrate operational value.
The 2024 NDS established why northern posture matters. The 2026 NDS goes further, positioning northern bases and the wider estate as infrastructure of deterrence, resilience and sustained operations in an era of contested logistics, fuel insecurity and supply chain disruption.
However, the 2026 IIP doesn’t appear to fully reflect this logic. The estate isn’t explicitly identified as a priority, and overall spending on enterprise and enabling functions will remain at 22 percent. Spending on enterprise infrastructure will increase from 5 percent to 7 percent, but investment in enhanced and resilient northern bases will decline from 4 percent to 3 percent, and theatre logistics and health will remain stagnant at 4 percent.
The strategy has sharpened, but the investment signal has not kept pace.
Raji Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow
The 2026 NDS demonstrates a clear recognition of our quickly deteriorating security environment. Australia is not alone in this: other countries recognise it too. This has led to an acceptance that countries need to develop greater self-reliance, though partnerships are also necessary.
For example, European countries have undertaken massive rearmaments in response to Russian aggression and the war in Ukraine. In our region, Japan is stepping up its defence preparedness while South Korea is building an advanced defence industry. Australia’s awareness of its worsening situation will also hopefully lead to a broader strategy emphasising regional partnerships – including with Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, India, and Vietnam – to enhance deterrence and defence. Ultimately, Australia cannot provide completely for itself, which means that these partnerships are as vital as defence spending.
