The time is right for Australia and the United Arab Emirates to deepen their defence relationship. For both countries it would be one of the most substantial partnerships outside existing formal alliances.
Momentum has been building since the Iran war started, with the highest-tempo exchange of visits the two countries have ever shared. Defence Minister Richard Marles visited Abu Dhabi in May and met with UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed. The visit followed Australia’s deployment of an E-7A Wedgetail aircraft, which added operational substance to the relationship. Soon after, UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation Reem Al Hashimy travelled to Canberra to meet Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.
The question now is whether Canberra and Abu Dhabi can build on this momentum.
Although the Iran conflict was an unexpected complication in Australia’s relationship with the UAE, Canberra’s response was quick and consequential. In March, it announced the deployment of an E-7A Wedgetail and around 85 personnel to provide airborne surveillance and battle management to Gulf air defences, and transferred AIM-120 Amraam missiles to replenish UAE stocks. These were among the most significant contributions Australia had made to a non-treaty partner in years.
Australia has a direct stake in the UAE. Around 24,000 Australians live in the UAE; 115,000 across the Middle East. The Australian Defence Force has operated out of Al Minhad Air Base near Dubai since 2003, where it keeps the headquarters for Joint Task Force 633. Iranian strikes hit the base in March.
The two countries signed a defence cooperation treaty in 2008, and their Joint Defence Cooperation Committee had met 11 times by 2022. But the Iran conflict has shown that they need to anticipate such crises through more frequent meetings, so that they can forge a deeper partnership consisting of joint exercises, shared planning and agreed procedures.
The UAE is Australia’s largest trade and investment partner in the region, with two-way trade totalling A$12.7 billion in 2024–25 and two-way investment stock reaching A$23.7 billion. In October 2025, Australia and the UAE signed a free trade agreement, covering sectors that will matter most over the next decade: green energy, data centres, mining and food security.
And yet the Gulf has long been marginal to Canberra’s strategic thinking, except when a regional crisis demands attention. Both governments must actively work to align their economic strategies with their defence relationship.
There are other reasons why a closer Australia–UAE defence relationship serves both countries.
For Australia, the UAE is a stable, capable, reform-minded partner, backed by significant sovereign wealth and genuine ambitions to modernise its armed forces. Its military has real combat experience, while its defence industry, anchored by advanced technology group EDGE, is maturing fast. The UAE’s strategic location sits across Australia’s supply chains, including for fuel and agricultural exports.
For the UAE, Australia offers proximity to Indo-Pacific markets, a reliable source of critical minerals and clean energy technology, plus a link to the Five Eyes and AUKUS frameworks. As AUKUS drives investment in undersea systems, autonomous platforms and advanced sensors, this industrial base offers something UAE entities cannot easily find elsewhere.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that came out of Albanese’s visit to Abu Dhabi in September 2025 provides the formal umbrella, but it is missing practical substance. The 2008 defence cooperation treaty provides the legal framework, but it must now be used to set up more structured joint exercises, real information-sharing arrangements and a joint industrial mechanism.
Australian strategic policy can follow a pattern where a crisis creates a momentum of visits and statements, only for the relationship to drift once the pressure fades. With the UAE, Canberra must break this pattern.
Three things should happen by the end of 2026. First, the two governments must set up a concrete program of joint exercises, logistics access provisions and a clear pathway to equipment interoperability under their defence cooperation treaty. Second, they need to establish a joint defence-industry working group focused on autonomous systems, surveillance and targeting technology, critical minerals and cybersecurity. Third, they should treat their commitments to clean energy, AI infrastructure and critical minerals under the free trade agreement as opportunities for shared strategic resilience.
Marles’s visit to Abu Dhabi and Al Hashimy’s reciprocal visit to Canberra in May were rare and significant. Australia has shown the UAE it is a reliable partner. The question now is whether Canberra will build something lasting from that trust, or settle for the warmth of good meetings and the slow cooling of an underdeveloped relationship. The UAE is not waiting for the world to stabilise, and Australia should not wait either.
