Just hours after Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Fiji on 6 July to agree enhance cooperation with the island state, Beijing fired a ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean.
Australia swiftly deplored the ‘provocative act’, and leaders of Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea subsequently urged global superpowers to respect those who live in the Pacific and to refrain from threatening behaviour.
China’s growing assertiveness in the Pacific is clearly destabilising. And while the test was perhaps not as threatening to Australia as it was for the island states, Beijing’s actions serve as a reminder of why Australia must continue investing in its relationships with regional partners.
According to the Lowy Institute, Australia accounts for 38 percent of total aid flow to Pacific island states over the past 15 years, dwarfing any other single donor. China’s 9 percent contribution certainly pales in comparison.
But Canberra is clear-eyed about the limits of aid alone. And, as Australian Minister for Pacific Island Affairs Pat Conroy said in 2024, Canberra must move beyond the patron-client relationship it has at times defaulted to.
The significance of this shift should not be understated. China’s engagement with the islands has become increasingly transactional, while the Trump administration’s fixation on hard power has eroded the normative foundations underpinning frameworks like the Pacific Island Forum’s 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy.
Canberra’s approach offers a viable option for the Pacific islands, providing investment without the political baggage that has come to define the alternatives.
Canberra and Port Vila signed the Nakamal agreement on 29 June, which bars foreign military bases being set up in Vanuatu. The deal is the latest in a string of Australian bilateral agreements that includes the Vuvale Partnership with Fiji and earlier agreements with Nauru and Tuvalu.
But while this deepening relationship is a positive step, China is barrelling towards a 435-ship fleet by 2030 and shows no signs of curtailing its push into the Pacific.
For the Pacific islands, Australia is not the only partner offering a credible alternative. Japan, too, has sought to engage with the islands on a more equal footing.
Tokyo hosted the Japan-Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue in February, where Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi called for the strengthening of the region’s interconnectivity. Four months later, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi affirmed at a summit in Tokyo that Japan would support island states in addressing climate risks. This is evidence of Japan using its growing diplomatic weight in the region.
Australia and Japan are already working together on one of the Pacific islands’ most pressing governance challenges. In the Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, Canberra and Tokyo pledged to support Pacific Island countries in combatting money laundering through capacity-building initiatives.
But the alignment between the countries runs deeper. At a leaders’ summit in May, Takaichi and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese committed to elevating the bilateral security partnership to an even higher level, for example by pursuing closer defence cooperation and securing shared access to critical minerals.
Tokyo, for its part, has consistently championed its vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. First envisioned more than a decade ago, this ideal seeks to uphold the rule of law and prevent coercion in the Indo-Pacific region, goals that align squarely with Canberra’s.
During a trip to Vietnam in May, Takaichi committed Japan to playing a ‘more proactive role than ever before’ in supporting an international order based on the principle of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Koizumi echoed this sentiment at the Shangri-La Dialogue, where he unveiled a revised vision of the concept founded on trust, transparency and dialogue.
But securing that vision carries hard costs. Under Takaichi, Tokyo’s defence budget has exceeded A$78 billion for the first time. The expedited revision of Japan’s three strategic documents and Tokyo’s participation in the multinational Balikatan military exercise further signal to Australia and other partners that Japan is committed to upholding the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
In recognition of the increasingly important security partnership with Tokyo, Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy identified Japan as an ‘indispensable partner for achieving regional peace and prosperity’.
But deterring China in the region and upholding the principle of sovereignty throughout the Indo-Pacific will require continued and expanded collaboration.
In particular, sea lines of communication are likely to remain hotly contested. And while Australia and New Zealand are expected to play a leading role in providing training focused on protecting those lines, Japan is geographically and technically well placed to support.
Every partner Canberra brings into the fold reinforces the strength of the rules-based international order against an increasingly assertive Beijing that is looking to expand military activities even further into the Pacific.
Japan and Australia already enjoy a relationship built on decades of trust and partnership, but bilateral cooperation can be taken further. In the Pacific, this will be critical to defending Pacific island sovereignty and upholding a regional framework based on mutual prosperity and security.
