By Pratnashree Basu
The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) marks an explicit “America First” strategic posture, accentuating core national interests over broad liberal internationalism. In contrast with recent NSS documents prepared under prior administrations, the 2025 strategy frames global engagement principally through a lens of strategic self-interest rather than collective security or normative order-building. This is evident in three interlinked takeaways: a realist prioritisation of US interests through selective engagement; an economic-nationalist focus on reshoring and resilient supply chains to counter predatory practices; and a model of conditional hegemony in which American leadership is sustained only when allies demonstrably share burdens and align their policies with Washington’s strategic objectives.
The strategy also elevates economic security instruments, from export controls to industrial policy and critical minerals security, as central to national defence, effectively treating economic interdependence as a terrain of competition rather than cooperation. This ideological repositioning is consequential as it reframes how US security commitments are conceptualised, articulated, and operationalised, with significant implications for allies.
Strategic Omissions and Transactional Focus
Strikingly, the NSS contains notable omissions that weaken its strategic coherence. References to the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, a key regional threat, are absent, leaving unaddressed one of the most direct dangers faced by Japan and South Korea. Equally important is the absence of reference to “revisionist” states at a time when the limits of international law and norms are being frequently challenged. The strategy also overlooks the Philippines, a frontline US treaty ally central to forward military posture. India is mentioned only in the context of economic cooperation and its contributions through the Quad, indicating a rather narrow view of its growing strategic role. Compounding these gaps is the apparent contradiction between the NSS’s calls to transform Washington’s treaty partners (for ex, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines) into an economic grouping driven by private-sector engagement, and the administration’s scepticism toward multilateral economic forums.
The document frames China as a key economic competitor and a central consideration in Indo-Pacific security, emphasising the need to rebalance economic relations and address its growing economic influence while strengthening deterrence in the region. It underlines cooperation with allies and partners to deter attempts to alter the status quo in critical theatres such as Taiwan. Taiwan is framed as strategically vital due to its semiconductor dominance and its position along key maritime chokepoints, making deterrence and the preservation of the status quo central to US efforts to maintain military overmatch and prevent any attempt to alter the balance across the first and second island chains. The NSS also highlights correcting “predatory economic practices” and seeks more balanced trade with Beijing as part of a broader economic-security strategy. However, the strategy notably downplays the ideological framing and systemic-rivalry language present in earlier US documents, opting instead for a more transactional and measured description of competition with China.
For the Indo-Pacific, it signals a new set of expectations regarding burden-sharing, capability-building, and economic alignment. The NSS affirms that the Indo-Pacific remains a central theatre of great-power competition, especially given China’s economic and military rise and the importance of maritime trade routes. It frames the region as integral to US prosperity and security, requiring robust deterrence and the prevention of hegemonic dominance by any single power.
Yet this affirmation is paired with an explicit redefinition that the United States will not act as a standalone security guarantor or global policeman but will instead insist that security partnerships be reciprocal, operationally rigorous, and economically aligned with US strategic goals. While earlier NSS documents tacitly advocated increases in allied defence spending, the new strategy frames these increases as a prerequisite for sustained US engagement. This conditionality fundamentally alters the calculus for regional states. Rather than relying primarily on US extended deterrence as an absolute safeguard, partners must now demonstrate self-sufficiency, credible deterrence capabilities, and economic strategies that align with US objectives, particularly in technology, trade balance, and critical supply chains.
Strategic Implications for Japan
While the NSS underscores the US–Japan alliance as central to Indo-Pacific security, Japan is mentionedonly in relation to the Quad, burden-sharing, and deterrence against domination in areas such as the South China Sea. Once again, the implicit promise of US backing is now conditioned on reciprocal action from Tokyo. The alliance partnership with Japan is no longer to be evaluated solely through the lens of diplomatic alignment or basing arrangements but increasingly through capability investment, interoperability, and economic alignment with US strategic priorities, including trade policy and supply-chain resilience. This places Japan at a strategic inflexion point: to maintain alliance relevance and deterrence credibility, Tokyo must continue enhancing its military capabilities—potentially going beyond its already ambitious trajectory toward 2 percent of GDP in defence spending—and optimising weapons systems for joint operations with US forces.
The demand for capability enhancement dovetails with Japan’s evolving defence posture. Tokyo has already accelerated its defence modernisation in response to what it has already identified as a deteriorating regional security environment. This involves investments aimed at reinforcing the credibility of deterrence and collective security while at the same time preparing for a potentially larger operational role in Taiwan-related contingencies—an evolution that remains politically and constitutionally sensitive in Tokyo. At the same time, Japan will be pushed to align its defence-industrial standards more closely with the US to enable seamless joint production, sustainment, and long-term defence industrial and technology cooperation with the US, particularly in semiconductors and critical minerals. In order to do so, Tokyo will need to navigate a sensitive domestic landscape. This underscores the intricate task for Japanese policymakers who must navigate the sharpening of existing debates on economic security, advance robust capabilities and alliance integration, and do so while maintaining domestic legitimacy and constitutional coherence.
Risks and Opportunities
The 2025 NSS introduces a sharper, more transactional (albeit operationally ambiguous) framework, carrying significant consequences for Japan and the wider Indo-Pacific. However, this is not surprising as the document is in line with Trump 2.0’s approach over the past year. The emphasis on conditional US commitments risks further unsettling an already tenuous regional confidence, encouraging hedgingbehaviour at a time when stability demands cohesion. Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the thresholds of US intervention injects uncertainty into crisis dynamics, especially around Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and China’s increasing grey-zone advances. For Japan, rapid alignment with Washington’s economic-security agenda may provoke domestic resistance, complicating policy execution.
Yet, the strategy also creates openings. As the US narrows its focus to interest-driven partnerships, Japan’s role as a reliable, high-capacity ally becomes more central. Tokyo is potentially positioned to expand defence-industrial cooperation with the US, play a greater role in shaping regional security architectures as others hedge, and influence the recalibration of deterrence across the first island chain. The strategic challenge for Japan is to convert these openings into durable gains while maintaining the political and diplomatic agility needed in an environment where US commitments are more conditional and Indo-Pacific stability increasingly depends on credible leadership.
- About the author: Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
- Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
