It may be no more than an annual ritual: the Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President meeting each other alternately in either country. However, the current geopolitical churn creates a special interest in Vladimir Putin’s impending visit to India, tentatively planned for the first week of December 2025, to attend the 23rd India-Russia Summit.
He is expected to devote a large part of his meeting with Narendra Modi to finding ways to keep the strategic relationship alive amid New Delhi’s continuing attempts to arrive at a compromise trade deal with Donald Trump’s America.
Unlike Putin’s India visit in 2021, which was a quieter affair, New Delhi is now laying out the trappings to greet the Russian President. Although the visit may not witness the grand optics mostly reserved for US leaders, a slew of preparatory visits by senior officials from either side are underway to make Putin’s official trip appear out of the ordinary.
On 7 August, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval called on Putin. In September, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev met Modi during his two-day trip to India.
Last week, Indian External Affairs Minister Subramanyam Jaishankar, who was in Moscow to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Heads of Government meeting, held discussions on global affairs with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. Jaishankar also called on Putin. In the official photo, both were seen engaging in a warm handshake, which Indian media interpreted as indicative of the “strong India-Russia friendship and strategic ties”. Jaishankar went on to inaugurate two Indian consulates in the Russian cities of Yekaterinburg and Kazan, expanding India’s diplomatic footprint in Russia.
The visit of Nikolay Patrushev, Putin’s aide and head of Russia’s Maritime Board, to New Delhi last week matched Jaishankar’s itinerary. Patrushev met Doval and Modi soon after.
India’s significance in the eyes of the present US administration has seemingly diminished.
Call these dress rehearsals or intensified consultations; such conversations are mood-ascertaining moves to finalise the agenda during the Modi-Putin meeting. Such high-profile meetings usually result in a slew of agreements and expressions of interest. Last time, the joint statement issued at the end of the India-Russia Summit in July 2024, for which Modi had travelled to Moscow, was a lengthy 5,400-word document. Much of it was a repeat of a lengthier 6,300-word joint statement issued following talks in New Delhi in December 2021.
This time, the focus of discussions can be expected to be mainly on two issues – Russian oil purchases and defence.
India is seeking respite from high tariffs on its exports imposed by the Trump administration. New Delhi appears to have capitulated to American pressure to decrease its crude imports from Russia and sign a deal for importing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from the United States.
This is unlikely to please Putin, who suggested that India should indulge in a cost-benefit analysis on importing cheap Russian crude and being sanctioned by Washington rather than importing expensive energy from the US and other sources to reduce high tariffs. If the costs are the same for both scenarios, Putin surmised, while speaking at the annual meeting of the Valdai discussion club on security on 2 October in Sochi, India should continue its crude imports from Russia. “The people of a country like India, believe me, will closely monitor the decisions made by the political leadership and will never allow any humiliation (by the US) in front of anyone”, he gently reminded the Indian participants in the meeting.
While New Delhi chose to ignore Putin’s advice on crude sales, it must find ways to placate him in others. This is where expanding defence deals becomes crucial.
Defence ties with Russia form one of the most crucial aspects of the relations between New Delhi and Moscow. Comparatively cheaper prices and speedy availability of service and spare parts have been factors for India’s continued reliance on Russian defence systems, despite US pressure.
The Russia-Ukraine war, however, has been a spoiler. Two of the five S-400 squadrons of air defence systems ordered by India since 2018 remain undelivered. Despite this, India is looking at adding more S-400s and even S-500s to its wish list. Russia’s offer of manufacturing fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighters in India is a huge attraction. Not only will that align with India’s aims to have defence production at home, it will also further deepen technological cooperation with Moscow.
With the challenges posed by Trump, India is trying hard to cling to its policy of pursuing strategic autonomy. Maintaining ties with Russia and improving relations with China are important. This policy of pursuing autonomy appeared to work well as long as India had US support. New Delhi could secure exemptions and receive special treatment even when its policies didn’t align well with those of Washington.
Those days may have passed. India’s significance in the eyes of the present US administration has seemingly diminished. New Delhi is instead looking at options to indulge other global powers. Putin’s visit to India could be a catalyst to strengthen India-Russia ties.
