When then secretary of defense Jim Mattis changed the name of US Pacific Command to ‘Indo-Pacific Command’ in 2018, he said the command boundaries stretched from Bollywood to Hollywood and from polar bears to penguins. Those boundaries were the same before the name changed and remain unaltered after the current secretary, Pete Hegseth, changed it back on 16 June.
So, if the boundaries haven’t changed and there is no hint of a redistribution of forces (again, as in 2018), why has the name changed?
Back then, Mattis made the point at the change-of-command ceremony between Admiral Harry Harris and Admiral Phillip Davidson that the change better reflected the interconnectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
It also aligned with the re-designation in the first Trump administration of the region as the Indo-Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific. When that happened, US deputy assistant secretary of state Alex Wong noted that ‘Indo-Pacific’ acknowledged the historic and current reality that South Asia and in particular India played a key role in the Pacific, East Asia and Southeast Asia. The unstated signal to China was the United States was prepared to contest the Belt and Road Initiative west through the Indian Ocean.
And within a short period, global nomenclature had shifted – from the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific to the first Quad foreign ministers’ joint statement and the first European Union Indo-Pacific strategy, both in 2021.
‘Indo-Pacific’ became part of a triumvirate – along with the Quad and AUKUS – of elements China considered as constraining its objective of regional dominance and hence in need of terminating.
Three potential reasons come to mind for readopting ‘US Pacific Command’ and its abbreviation ‘PACOM’, replacing ‘INDOPACOM’. The first, and most likely, is to take the stated reason on face value. It’s a nod to history – restoring the original name given on the establishment of the command in 1947 by president Harry Truman and honouring the command’s contributions to the regional security architecture established after World War II.
The second reason could be more about Hegseth’s branding changes in his department. It follows his push to rename the Department of Defense as the Department of War – again described at the time as a nod to history and the original purpose of the department. It would not be the first time a secretary or minister had sought to stamp authority on an institution through name changes. And Hegseth gave a hint in his speech at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue that a change back to ‘Pacific Command’ was coming, frequently using ‘Pacific’ and specifically describing the US as a Pacific nation.
The third reason could be a rhetorical alignment with the new US National Defense Strategy. At its heart, that strategy prioritises protecting the homeland. Regions close to the US now seem more important to Washington. There is no escaping the geographic reality that the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are on the east and west flank respectively of the continental US and that the Indian Ocean isn’t.
So how will this renaming signalling be received? India and other nations in the Indian Ocean may feel a little slighted. They may perceive the US is losing some interest in them. China may be in two minds. Beijing complained about the name change to ‘Indo-Pacific’ in 2018, claiming it was part of a Quad-driven strategy to encircle and constrain China. So the reversion may please Beijing on one level.
But on another level China may perceive the US is doubling down to focus on balancing Beijing in the Pacific Ocean as the main theatre of contest. By recalling warfighting purpose and prowess of decades past in the Pacific, a ‘Department of War’ and a ‘Pacific Command’ may give China pause. Indeed, while commentators will always spend some time analysing the inclusions and omissions of leader and secretary-level speeches, it may be this nod by Hegseth to president Teddy Roosevelt’s ‘speak softly and carry a big stick’ doctrine that keeps China more in check.
Lastly, on the issue of language: it will be interesting to see whether broader regional naming conventions change. Australia, Japan and other partners in the region use ‘Indo-Pacific’. In fact, the May 2026 Quad foreign ministers’ joint statement used the term often. This common language has been useful and for now it looks like the US is sticking with ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a regional term notwithstanding the command title change.
But a change to regional naming conventions risks allies and partners potentially talking at crossed purposes about what we once agreed was an increasingly connected Pacific and Indian ocean region. It also risks China sowing a narrative in the region about American withdrawal or disinterest. For that reason, it is up to both the US and its regional allies, including Australia and Quad partners, to ensure the narrative is of democratic powers working together for regional security.
