
Without careful coordination, the Australia–Canada–India Technology and Innovation (ACITI) Partnership risks becoming another partnership that under-delivers on its ambitious objectives. Managed effectively, however, it could form the nucleus of an intercontinental democratic technology coalition, combining complementary strengths in technology, minerals and clean energy.
Australia, Canada and India launched the ACITI partnership at the G20 summit in Johannesburg in November, at a time when critical minerals, clean-energy supply chains and artificial intelligence are emerging as key areas of global competition. The initiative reflects a growing impulse to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, accelerate green energy innovation, and shape emerging technology norms. Its value hinges on whether the three partners can reconcile differing regulatory systems, industrial priorities and commercial approaches.
The rationale for ACITI is clear. According to the International Energy Agency’s Critical Minerals Market Review 2023, China controls between 60 and 90 percent of global processing capacity for critical minerals such as rare earths, graphite and manganese. It also controls more than 80 percent of global solar manufacturing capacity and roughly 70 percent of lithium-ion battery cathode and anode production. This concentration exposes systemic vulnerabilities for countries seeking to scale clean-energy systems and advanced manufacturing.
ACITI seeks to link the partners’ complementary strengths into a more resilient supply-chain ecosystem that is less dependent on China. Australia and Canada hold some of the world’s richest reserves of lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earths. India brings industrial scale, a rapidly growing manufacturing base and expanding energy demand.
The partnership is particularly important for Australia, as Canberra’s Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030 identifies dependence on Chinese processing as a strategic and economic risk. Indeed, roughly 70 percent of Australia’s raw lithium exports go to China. ACITI offers pathways to diversify processing partners, attract investment into onshore and joint downstream facilities, and access India’s growing clean-tech and energy-storage markets. India’s renewable energy targets—including 500 gigawatts of non-fossil power capacity by 2030—create a predictable demand for Australian minerals, technology and regulatory expertise. Canada’s compliance with environmental, social and governance (ESG) frameworks complements Australia’s standards, while India provides the commercial scale neither developed economy can achieve alone.
ACITI also intersects with Australia’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Canberra has been deepening technology and supply-chain cooperation through the Quad, the Minerals Security Partnership and the US-Australia Climate, Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transformation Compact. While Canada has a strong resource base but a limited Indo-Pacific footprint, and India prioritises rapid industrial expansion, Australia sits at the centre of overlapping networks. This position allows Canberra to influence standards on critical-mineral transparency, AI governance and clean-energy technology development across multiple blocs simultaneously.
Significant uncertainties remain. Australia and Canada operate highly regulated, ESG-focused mining and processing systems, while India prioritises rapid scaling, domestic job creation and cost competitiveness. Aligning these approaches will be challenging. Large-scale processing and technology projects require billions in capital, and political cycles in Canada and India could slow progress. China could respond strategically, as it has elsewhere, by manipulating prices, restricting exports, or subsidising domestic production, potentially undermining ACITI-aligned projects.
Despite these challenges, there are tangible early wins. Achievable short-term goals include joint feasibility studies for processing facilities; pilot research programs on battery materials; and coordinated regulatory approaches to mineral traceability and ESG standards. Cooperation on AI governance—particularly in public-sector applications such as health systems, agriculture and cybersecurity—present another low-risk, high-benefit avenue. Delivering early, visible outcomes will be essential for establishing ACITI’s credibility and demonstrating value beyond existing mechanisms.
While ACITI is not explicitly framed as a counterweight to China, its objectives intersect with broader trends in economic security in the Indo-Pacific such as the diversification of technology and mineral supply chains and the emergence of democratic standards in AI and clean energy. If implemented effectively, ACITI could catalyse middle-power cooperation, reinforcing transparency, resilience and sustainability in global technology governance.
For Australia, three priorities are clear. First, secure early, demonstrable outcomes that establish credibility and momentum. Second, leverage Canberra’s regulatory expertise to shape ESG, safety and AI standards across the trilateral. Third, build private-sector confidence through predictable funding models and risk-sharing arrangements. By focusing on these areas, Canberra can reduce dependence on China, accelerate its clean-energy transition and strengthen strategic alignment among its partners.
ACITI’s ultimate impact will depend on the ability of Australia, Canada and India to convert strategic intent into operational reality. If implemented properly, it might turn out to be a long-lasting and reliable basis for tech cooperation, supply-chain stability and democratic governance guidelines.