A US and allied strategy for Greenland

Executive summary

The United States and the Kingdom of Denmark, of which Greenland is an autonomous territory, have a long history of close cooperation in Greenland dating back to World War II. Greenland plays a vital role in US homeland defense; it is home to untapped deposits of raw materials vital for technology ranging from fighter jets to artificial intelligence. Though US rhetoric about taking control of Greenland exacerbated tensions between Washington and some of its closest European allies in January, the legacy of cooperation offers a stable foundation on which to build a path forward for Greenland that makes the United States stronger, safer, stronger, and more prosperous, consistent with the 2025 US National Security Strategy and the 2026 US National Defense Strategy. To accomplish these goals, this Atlantic Council strategy paper advocates for a “Defend, Deny, Deepen, and Develop” strategy, including the following lines of effort. 

To defend the United States’ security interests in Greenland, 

• Washington should give Greenland and the Arctic a clear strategic mandate, directing policymakers to make necessary investments to enhance the United States’ ability to operate in the region; and  
• the United States should take full advantage of the access granted to it by the 1951 US–Denmark Defense agreement by investing in its homeland defense infrastructure in Greenland, including in renovations at Pituffik Space Base and reopening shuttered defense sites elsewhere on the island. 

To deny adversary dominance of Greenland and the broader Arctic, the United States and its allies should 

• collaborate on new investment screening measures that further block adversary access to key resources and infrastructure; and 
• train and exercise regularly in Greenland to deter aggressive adversary activity.  
• To deepen allied engagement to help share the burden in Greenland and the Arctic, 
• the United States and Denmark should expand Denmark’s Host Nation Support (HNS) responsibilities in Denmark and explore opportunities for Denmark to shoulder more of the infrastructure and support costs for US presence in Greenland; and 
• NATO should expand the ARCTIC SENTRY mission into a permanent operation and explore options for additional persistent presence in the region, such as a Greenland air policing mission.  

To develop Greenland’s economic potential, the United States, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the European Union (EU) should: 

• utilize financial incentives to reduce some of the financial risk of investing in Greenlandic mining, such as designating Greenland as a domestic source of supply under the US Defense Production Act; and 
• designate additional mining sites in Greenland as EU Critical Raw Minerals Act strategic projects, opening the door for prioritized financing for US, EU, and other friendly nation investments.  

Taken together, these recommendations advance US and allied interests in Greenland and the broader Arctic region. 

Strategic context

The United States is an Arctic nation. As such, ensuring the security of the Arctic region should be a key priority for the United States and its allies. Yet the region is increasingly contested. Russia has steadily invested in the Arctic, building and refurbishing civilian and military infrastructure in alignment with its strategic goals. China, despite not being an Arctic state, has also moved to position itself as a regional power in the Arctic, investing in capabilities and competencies while partnering with Russia. At the same time, the United States has underinvested in the region for decades, ceding presence and influence. Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump has made clear his desire for the United States to take a more active role in securing Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory forming part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a NATO ally. President Trump’s stated rationale for the United States’ securing Greenland has focused on three main points: Greenland’s importance for US national security and homeland defense; threats to Greenland posed by China and Russia; and the strategic and monetary value of critical mineral resources in Greenland. While President Trump’s efforts have focused on Greenland specifically, many of these concerns apply to the Arctic region as a whole.  

Greenland’s location is strategically valuable for the United States. Its geography makes it a critical site for early warning radars capable of detecting ballistic and other missile threats to the continental United States. Its position on the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap makes it crucial for monitoring maritime threats in the North Atlantic, such as nuclear-armed Russian submarines. Greenland’s northern position also makes it an ideal location for space domain awareness and control and for satellite downlink capabilities. As the Arctic continues to open over the coming decades, Greenland’s location will grow in importance as more commercial, and potentially military, activity takes place in the region.   

The US security presence in Greenland dates back to World War II, when the United States used Greenland as a critical stopover site for aircraft crossing the North Atlantic, launched anti-submarine patrols from the island, and prevented Nazi Germany from using Greenland as a weather station. In 1951, the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark signed a defense agreement granting the United States sweeping access to Greenland and the ability to build infrastructure, station troops, and operate from the island. The United States operated several air bases, airfields, and radar sites in Greenland during the Cold War. But since the 1990s, US policy and budgetary decisions have reduced long-term US presence in Greenland to approximately two hundred personnel at Pituffik Space Base.   

While China and Russia have increased their Arctic presence in recent years, the threat of them taking kinetic military action against Greenland is currently minimal. China has increased its interest and activity in the Arctic since at least 2018, when it declared itself a “near Arctic state.” China operates five icebreaking and ice-capable research vessels, which it uses for scientific research and dual-use military applications at both poles. China has also sought to fund infrastructure and mining projects in Greenland as part of its “Polar Silk Road.” However, most of these efforts have not come to fruition as Denmark and Greenland are well aware of the risks of Chinese investment. Today only one unrealized mining site in Greenland has any level of Chinese investment, and it is a minority stake. Similarly, the other Arctic allies (Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) have restricted Chinese investment in critical infrastructure projects and moved to end projects with Chinese involvement. 

Russia, as the largest Arctic state and with the most Arctic coastline, has invested heavily in both civilian and military Arctic infrastructure. These investments have been concentrated within Russia, focused on developing Russia’s own abundant Arctic resources and reopening and renovating Soviet-era bases along its northern coast, which it seeks to develop into the “Northern Sea Route” shipping corridor. The Arctic holds outsized importance for Russia’s security and Moscow has maintained an active presence in the region. However, this activity has been largely restricted to the Russian Arctic or its immediate surroundings . Indeed, there have been at least a dozen provocative Russian military actions near Alaska in the last five years, compared to none (to date) around Greenland. Russia has also increased its presence in and around the Norwegian island of Svalbard, via increased economic investments and more active governance efforts. Russia is allowed to do this under the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which grants all signatory nations equal rights to property ownership and commercial activity and states that the territory cannot be used for “warlike purposes.”   

The United States and the broader NATO Alliance have not prioritized the Arctic region since the end of the Cold War. A changed geopolitical landscape and other defense and security priorities—first in the Middle East and then in the Indo-Pacific—mean that the Arctic has been an afterthought in defense planning for the last thirty years. This was due, in part, to the reluctance of Canada and other allies to bring NATO into the Arctic. Policymakers have started paying more attention to the region, but competing priorities and senior leaders’ poor understanding of the Arctic’s importance have stymied efforts to invest in Arctic capabilities and defense infrastructure, including in Greenland and Alaska. 

Greenland is home to untapped deposits of critical minerals and rare earth elements important for modern technology. Currently, China mines some 60 percent of the world’s critical minerals and has an even larger share of processing and separation capacity, giving it control of the supply chain for these resources. Developing alternative sources capable of easing bottlenecks in key minerals such as graphite, uranium, and heavy rare earth elements would be immensely valuable. In recent years, Greenland has encouraged mining exploration to develop these deposits, soliciting bids from US and other Western sources. However, commercial mining in Greenland is expensive. The harsh Arctic climate limits when work can happen, and Greenland’s lack of infrastructure means that everything—including roads, ports, power infrastructure, and housing—must be built from scratch at each prospective site. At these costs, current economic conditions do not support large-scale commercial mining in Greenland. Greenlanders themselves have expressed their opposition to prior mining projects out of concern for mining’s environmental impact, making such projects potentially politically costly as well. 

In Greenland, there are historical tensions between local communities and the Danish government, raising questions about the territory’s governance. The vast majority of Greenlanders support independence at some point in the future, but differ as to how soon that should happen. In any case, the process would be time consuming. The Greenlandic government must first formally declare that it seeks independence, after which Greenland and Denmark will enter negotiations regarding the timeline for exit, citizenship issues, and transfer of responsibilities for defense and foreign affairs, among other topics. Following these negotiations, a final independence agreement must be approved by the Greenlandic parliament and gain majority approval in a national referendum. Finally, the Danish parliament in Copenhagen must approve the agreement. 

Recent US actions toward Greenland have exacerbated tensions between Washington and some of its closest European allies. President Trump has repeatedly expressed a desire for the United States to take control of Greenland. The tensions peaked in early 2026, when President Trump declared his intention to own the island and threatened tariffs on European countries opposed to this course of action. In an effort to demonstrate solidary with Denmark, European nations increased their military presence in the Arctic and sent troops to Greenland, with Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland deploying small military contingents, while Denmark scaled up its presence. The tensions were eased when NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte intervened at the World Economic Forum at Davos, leading Trump to announce a framework for a deal. In mid-2026, a small group of US and Danish negotiators are working to elaborate and finalize this framework. 

This context demonstrates that there is a need for a clear and actionable strategy for the United States, alongside its allies, to realize its national security interests in Greenland. 

Goals

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in January 2025 that US foreign policy in the second Trump administration would be judged according to three questions: Does it make the United States safer? Does it make the United States stronger? Does it make the United States more prosperous?  

A US and allied strategy in Greenland must therefore ensure that the United States emerges stronger, safer, and more prosperous, consistent with the 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). 

The United States and its allies should seek an end state in which Washington and the transatlantic Alliance emerge stronger by facilitating an increased US military presence in Greenland and by securing allied military investments to strengthen the overall Alliance.   

The strategy must also guarantee that Greenland becomes a source of safety for Washington and the transatlantic Alliance. This would mean that adversarial nations are not able to use Greenland and its surrounds as a foothold to directly threaten, or project malign influence against, the United States and its allies. Greenland can also serve this purpose by becoming a base of operations for projecting power into the Arctic and protecting the US homeland.  

An effective strategy must also ensure that Greenland contributes to US and allied prosperity and supports critical supply chains. Greenland has abundant, yet untapped, resources and their development could create economic opportunities for the United States and its allies. Securing access to critical minerals will contribute to US and allied standards of living and the ability to lead the industries of the future.  

Implementing the strategy

This strategy provides a roadmap for the United States, alongside its allies and partners, to secure a stable Arctic region, safeguard US and allied security interests, and hinder adversary presence and influence. The United States and its allies already possess many of the tools and policy mechanisms to implement these goals, organized under the lines of effort outlined below via the existing Defense of Greenland Agreement and in continued cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark.    

The United States and its allies can achieve this end state through four main elements,  

• defend the US homeland; 
• deny adversary domination of Greenland and the Arctic;  
• deepen allied burden sharing in Greenland and the Arctic; and 
• develop Greenland’s economic potential. 

These elements closely mirror the strategic approach laid out in the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for defending the US homeland, deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, increasing allied burden sharing, and developing the defense industrial base. This strategy applies key elements of the NSS and NDS to Greenlandic and Arctic security and defense.  

Defend the homeland

Homeland defense is the top strategic priority in the 2025 NSS and 2026 NDS. Greenland plays a crucial role in this mission, as many of the most existential threats to the United States emanate from or pass through the Arctic. To increase homeland defense in the Arctic, the United States should pursue the following lines of effort.  

Give the Arctic a strategic mandate

The NDS identifies the need for the Department of Defense (DOD) to be able to secure key terrain in the Western Hemisphere. Greenland is especially vital terrain. However, the presidential focus on Greenland and the broader Arctic should be more clearly reflected in updated Arctic strategy documents that explicitly articulate the importance of the Arctic for US national security and direct US officials to make needed investments in Arctic capabilities, infrastructure, training, and posture. This mandate must be reiterated in subsequent Defense Planning Guidance documents that guide resource allocation in DOD’s annual budget process. A new National Strategy for the Arctic Region would further articulate US priorities across the whole of government. Without this clear mandate, US defense investments in Greenland will continue to be deprioritized against those in other regions, and the United States will continue to lag behind in the Arctic. 

Take full advantage of the 1951 agreement

he 1951 agreement between the United States and Kingdom of Denmark on the defense of Greenland gives the United States broad latitude to invest in defense infrastructure and operate from the island. The United States has several potential options to expand its presence in Greenland and make full use of its access under the 1951 agreement in ways it has not since the Cold War.  

The United States should work to accelerate investment in underfunded requirements related to Greenland. This work should include completing site surveys at former US defense sites in Greenland, as well as accelerating the planning and design of revitalized infrastructure there. The March 2026 announcement that the United States is pursuing increased access at three sites in Greenland is a welcome first step. To further expedite construction of new infrastructure once sites are identified, DOD should consider waiving the design threshold requirements for projects to receive construction funding.  

Infrastructure improvements and new or reopened US defense sites in Greenland should prioritize four key missions. Any US defense sites should 

• support the development of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture by hosting updated sensors and expanding space domain awareness and space command and control capabilities; 
• facilitate year-round fighter aircraft and unmanned airborne system operations from multiple sites across Greenland; 
• support increased maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine capabilities; and 
• provide refueling and repair facilities for US Navy vessels and US Coast Guard cutters in southern Greenland.  

The United States must also invest in Arctic-specific and Arctic-relevant capabilities that will enable the Joint Force to operate effectively in Greenland. Key priorities should include satellite communications, domain awareness sensors, and winterization for capabilities such as air defense systems. The United States must also continue its investment in the US Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter and Arctic Security Cutter programs, further enabling US security presence around Greenland and in the Arctic.  

Ensure long-term US access to Greenland

Given the importance of Greenland for defense of the US homeland, the United States should continue to take steps to ensure its continued access to the island across a range of scenarios, including Greenlandic independence. Greenland became a signatory of the 1951 US-Denmark Defense agreement in 2004, but Denmark is still responsible for its implementation as the agreement’s core functions relate to defense and foreign affairs. The transfer of the agreement’s responsibilities to an independent Greenland would likely be a matter for negotiation between Copenhagen and Nuuk during any eventual independence discussions. The United States should continue to clearly communicate the benefits of US presence in Greenland for the security and prosperity of Greenlanders so that, if Greenlanders opt for independence from Denmark, they choose to continue their defense and security relationship with the United States as a fully sovereign country.  

Increase Arctic training and exercises

Arctic operations on land, in the sea, and in the air are all incredibly complex, and specialized training and experience in Arctic conditions are necessary to operate effectively in the region. The US Joint Force should increase its Arctic training and exercises with an emphasis on operating in the North American Arctic, including Greenland. This should include an expansion of US Northern Command’s exercise in Alaska, Arctic Edge, and planners should shift major portions of the exercise to take place in winter. Arctic Edge 2025 was linked with US Indo-Pacific Command’s Exercise Northern Edge, building connectivity between the North American and Indo-Pacific theaters. This linkage should continue, and US and allied planners should examine linking these exercises with major exercises in the European theater, such as Nordic Response. Greenland should be incorporated into these exercises to familiarize US and allied forces with the island and demonstrate US and allied capability to defend it.

In addition to exercises, the United States should expand existing efforts to forge a lethal Arctic force. In 2022, the US Army introduced its newest combat training center, the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center-Alaska, where soldiers practice operating in subzero temperatures. Currently, only one Army unit has cycled through, but broader participation could expand Arctic warfighting expertise. Expanding unit rotations to include special forces and the US Marine Corps would broaden Arctic operational experience across the force, strengthening the military’s capability in extreme cold environments.

Fill the Arctic ambassador role

To provide a central point for current and future diplomacy regarding Greenland and in the Arctic region writ large, the Trump administration should fill the currently vacant role of ambassador-at-large for Arctic affairs at the US Department of State. The position was formally established in statute in the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act at the initiative of Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski. Appointing an ambassador-at-large will strengthen US diplomacy toward Greenland and in the broader Arctic by empowering a senior official to serve as the point person for foreign governments and corporations looking to cooperate or invest in the Arctic, and to represent US Arctic interests at international forums.  

The Arctic ambassador position should also serve a larger role across the region. The ambassador should establish and convene the diplomatic equivalent of the Department of Defense-led Arctic Security Policy Roundtable and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. The ambassador should also consider inviting non-Arctic allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to this forum, helping to build a strong, likeminded group of states committed to a free, open, and secure Greenland and Arctic region. This group can help establish and set norms that highlight the bad behavior of adversaries across the region, while promoting investment and scientific opportunities in Greenland and the Arctic.  

Deny adversary domination of Greenland and the Arctic

The 2025 NSS calls for preventing adversaries from dominating important regions. It also calls for a Western Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets. Both Russia and China pose acute and long-term threats to the United States in the Arctic across the competition spectrum. To achieve its goals for the Arctic, the United States must work with its allies and partners to deny these adversaries the ability to dominate the region militarily and economically. 

Block Russian and Chinese investment from critical resources

The Arctic is home to a vast array of natural resources including critical minerals, fossil fuels, and marine protein. Climate change-fueled opening of the region is increasing the accessibility and economic viability of these resources. As these trends continue, the seven Arctic allies must continue to ensure that China and Russia are unable to gain a stake in critical resources on allied territory, which would strengthen the already dominant position of China in the critical mineral supply chain and provide adversaries the opportunity to weaponize access. This requires coordinated strengthening of investment screening laws across the likeminded Arctic states to further protect against malign economic activity. At the same time, the Arctic states must invest in their own communities and resources, therefore making them less vulnerable to Chinese or Russian investment bids in the first place. Along with mineral exploration in places like Greenland, this should include investment in communications and internet access, port facilities, and local energy infrastructure. This is especially important for the United States and Canada, whose Arctic regions are relatively less developed than the European High North.  

Deter and defeat adversary provocations

Russia and China have used the Arctic as a theater to probe and test US and allied capability to respond to provocative military activity. Russian aircraft routinely challenge US and allied airspace in the Arctic, and Russian and Chinese vessels have sailed together in the Bering Sea. These actions across the Arctic stress US and allied resources and increase the risk of miscalculation and accidental escalation.  

The United States must manage the presence of Russia and China in the Arctic region, while deterring and defeating their ability to undermine US and allied security interests. As a first step, supporting the modernization of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), alongside Canada, can ensure that the United States and Canada have the right sensors to detect threats that enter North American airspace. When Chinese spy balloons floated over North America in 2023, US officials revealed that the Pentagon had missed at least four similar instances. Through NORAD modernization efforts, the United States and Canada are already updating sensors to better identify and track threats, a crucial step in understanding how adversaries are engaging in the Arctic.  

The United States should also call out bad behavior by adversaries in the region. Publicizing when adversaries violate US and allied sovereign territory can help reinforce Washington’s commitment to the region. In extreme cases, or in the case of repeated adversarial violations of US and allied sovereignty, Washington should look to respond with economic measures such as sanctions.  

Deepen allied burden sharing in the Arctic

The 2025 NSS and the 2026 NDS call for increased allied burden sharing. The United States will not be able to secure the homeland or deny adversary ambitions in the Arctic alone. It needs allies to continue stepping up in the region and playing a larger role in Arctic defense and security. NATO should be the primary forum for these efforts.

Strengthen Arctic Sentry

In February 2026, NATO launched Arctic Sentry, a multidomain enhanced vigilance activity that consolidates NATO allies’ activities into one coherent approach. Arctic Sentry builds on the successful Baltic Sentry activity, which was established to safeguard allied critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and provide a more persistent allied presence in the region to deter malign Russian action. The threats that prompted Baltic Sentry—vulnerable critical infrastructure and provocative Russian actions—are present in the Arctic as well.

The details regarding Arctic Sentry remain slim, with no insight on the quantity of troops or types of military assets, butassets but making Arctic Sentry a recurring NATO activity would send a strong deterrent message. The exercise should emphasize the air and maritime domains to enhance all-domain awareness and to grow more robust than the current Icelandic Air Policing mission. A regular Arctic Sentry activity could subsume that mission as part of a larger and more far-reaching standing activity focused on the GIUK Gap.

Denmark and other allies are already stepping up in the region. Denmark has invested more than $13.7 billion in the last year in Arctic-relevant capabilities including new Arctic patrol vessels, P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft, and unmanned systems. Other highly capable allies such as Norway and the United Kingdom can contribute their expertise and capabilities to an expanded presence around Greenland. This additional support from allied air and maritime assets will extend NATO’s ability to monitor threats in the region and deter aggression.

Plan for NATO in the Arctic

NATO’s role in the Arctic must evolve to meet the new regional security environment. Historically, many of the Arctic allies have resisted a larger role for NATO in the region, but the importance of the Arctic for deterrence and defense means that NATO must devote more attention and resources there. Immediate steps like those operations outlined above are a good start, but the Alliance must put plans in place to prepare for a more substantial future role. This should start with planning for a more substantial European contribution to Regional Plan Northwest, part of NATO’s family of plans that covers the Arctic and European High North. In the short term, NATO should also develop a whole-of-Alliance Arctic strategy outlining the Alliance’s approach to the region. This strategy must not disrupt the Arctic allies’ primacy in the region, but it should serve as a guidepost for aligning resources to meet Alliance responsibilities for deterrence and defense in the Arctic. Over the long term, the Alliance should use the NATO Defense Planning Process to direct needed investment in Arctic capabilities in support of Regional Plan Northwest and the Alliance Arctic strategy. 

NATO should also account for the Arctic’s importance for the space domain. Increased allied investment in Arctic capabilities should include support for space domain capabilities, including Arctic satellite communications (for example, through the NORTHLINK initiative) and satellite downlink sites. These investments will provide resilience for allied capabilities in the region and support operations elsewhere within the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s area of responsibility.  

Create new HNS responsibilities

The 1951 agreement provides US defense access to Greenland without any obligation of compensation to Greenland or Denmark. Indeed, the only major US cost for its footprint in Greenland is the base maintenance contract for Pituffik Space Base, which in recent years has gone to a Greenlandic company. At the same time, Denmark does not have any financial HNS obligations to support US presence in Greenland. This means that all efforts to improve US capabilities to support the defense of Greenland are supported by US taxpayers. Other NATO allies that host US forces, such as Lithuania and Poland, provide HNS including constructing housing facilities, training ranges, and supporting logistics. In line with the NSS and NDS’s emphasis on defense burden shifting to European allies, the United States and Denmark should identify opportunities for Denmark to provide additional HNS, thereby reducing the burden on the United States. HNS spending by Denmark should count toward the NATO requirement that member states spend 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, helping Denmark continue to meet its overall spending targets.

Consider the role of non-NATO allies in the Arctic

While the focus has been on NATO’s role in the Arctic, there is also a role for non-Arctic, non-NATO allies to play. Japan, for example, is a close ally of the United States and has long maintained a focus on the Arctic, having been present at the signing declaration of the Arctic Council and being granted observer status in 2009. Other allies, such as South Korea, are also interested in taking a larger role in Arctic governance and policy, while increasing their scientific presence in the region. There is an opportunity to include these partners in the defense and security of Greenland and the Arctic writ large, through inviting them to participate in joint drills and training exercises. At the same time, the United States and its NATO allies should be aware of the precedent that inviting non-Arctic states into the region might set. A superior option could be to bring Japan, South Korea, and other non-NATO allies into the region as trusted partners on economic and scientific issues.  

Develop Greenland’s economic potential

The 2025 NSS calls for the United States to secure access to critical supply chains and materials.  Greenland is home to significant, untapped resources, the development of which has the potential to transform Greenland’s economy and turn it into a trustworthy source of critical minerals for US industry. However, the high cost of mining in Greenland has thus far limited Western investment, raising concerns that China or Russia could offer attractive investment in Greenland. The United States and its allies cannot just focus on denying China and Russia the opportunity to expand their economic footprint in Greenland or the Arctic; they must bolster their own economic presence and provide an alternative to adversary investment. The United States and its allies have several tools available to incentivize and support investment in Greenland. Bolstering investment in Greenland can help the United States and its allies maintain control over strategic supplies of minerals and other resources, while positioning Washington as the partner of choice. One way to do so would be to explore the potential for a partnership between the US Development Finance Corporation and the Danish International Finance Organization to jointly invest in mining, facilitate the development of needed infrastructure, and de-risk some of these projects, making them more attractive to private investors.  

Use the Defense Production Act to finance mining in Greenland

The Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 grants the US government authority to shape the US industrial base in the interest of national defense. The DPA allows the president to designate certain materials as critical and includes various mechanisms to incentivize businesses to prioritize production of these materials in support of national defense. Title III of the DPA includes the authority to offer incentives such as loans, loan guarantees, purchases, and purchase commitments to businesses developing sources of critical materials. While Title III is aimed at increasing domestic supply of critical materials, Congress is able to designate foreign countries as domestic sources under this section, expanding eligibility for the incentives offered in the DPA. Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia are all treated as domestic sources of supply under Title III, allowing US businesses to access funding incentives for critical material projects in these countries.  

In order to offset some of the financial burden and the risk of developing critical mineral resources in Greenland, the US Congress should designate Greenland as a domestic source of supply under Title III of the DPA. Granting access to DPA incentives for mining in Greenland will allow private firms to assume less financial risk in exploring and developing Greenlandic resources, thereby accelerating investment and providing more alternatives to risky funding from adversaries. Other options across the US government to boost investment in Greenland include the Export Import Bank and the Development Finance Corporation, both of which Washington should explore using.  

Ensure European and transatlantic support for mining development

The European Union and Kingdom of Denmark should continue utilizing their own mechanisms to support development of Greenlandic resources. Under its Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), the EU has so far designated two mining sites in Greenland as strategic projects, facilitating prioritized access to financing. The EU should work with the Greenlandic government and European, US, and other reliable third-country firms to identify further sites in Greenland that could receive strategic project status. The Kingdom of Denmark can also utilize its own financial incentives, such as those under the Green Investment Program, to further support mining exploration in Greenland. At the same time, the United States, Denmark, and Greenland should come to an agreement to identify and finance new mining sites, avoiding duplication of EU efforts and ensuring that resources are targeting the most critical sites for increasing allied mineral security, not just the most economically viable. Offtake agreements coordinated among NATO allies could be a way to boost the demand of critical minerals from Greenland and overcome the high cost they will likely have. Increased economic investment in Greenland would also benefit Greenland itself, unlocking new economic opportunities and spurring development.

Assumptions and risks

This strategy paper offers a productive path forward for US engagement in Greenland, underpinned by several assumptions as detailed below. If any of these assumptions prove false, that would alter the recommendations put forth in this paper and change US posture toward Greenland and the Arctic. This strategy also brings with it several risks that policymakers should consider.  

Assumptions

1. The United States will remain a leading member of NATO. First, this strategy assumes that the United States will remain a member, and indeed the leading member, of NATO. This will enable the United States to influence decisions within the Alliance that will affect how its allies approach Arctic defense and security. Continued US membership in NATO also provides a significant deterrent against Russian aggression in the short term. If the US role in NATO shrank significantly, the other thirty-one allies would need to drastically reassess their posture in the region and the resources they would be able to commit to the Arctic. The United States would risk losing a significant force multiplier, especially regarding forward defense against Russian aggression. Without an engaged United States, NATO might also incentivize short-term Russian aggression against NATO in the Arctic and elsewhere. 
2. Russia will maintain its adversarial posture toward NATO over the short to medium term. A short-term end to the fighting in Ukraine will not change Russia’s overall approach to confrontation with the West, nor incentivize European allies to immediately restart normal relations with Russia. While the Trump administration might pursue some commercial partnerships with Russia in the event of an end to the war in Ukraine, Russia and President Vladimir Putin will maintain their overall confrontational approach. A dramatic change in Russian policy—for example, due to a change in leadership—would change the overall security environment in the Arctic and result in changes to NATO’s approach to the region.  
3. Rising global temperatures will continue to open the region to new activity, increasing Greenland’s strategic importance. Reduced sea ice will open new shipping routes, potentially including a seasonal transpolar route, and warmer temperatures will lengthen the time available for mining or other infrastructure projects across the Arctic. This will increase the Arctic’s economic output and therefore its strategic importance. However, the Arctic will remain a relatively remote region with a challenging climate. Over the short to medium term, the continued challenges in the region combined with global economic trends might not incentivize Arctic economic development to the extent assumed in this paper.  
4. China’s interest in the Arctic will continue over at least the medium term, but it will remain a secondary theater compared to Taiwan and the first island chain. China’s presence in the Arctic will continue over the short to medium term. For Beijing, the mission to build a “Polar Silk Road,” is driven primarily by economic interests, such as unlocking shorter trade routes and exploiting Arctic resources. However, China will continue to prioritize issues in its own immediate neighborhood, especially Taiwan, in comparison to its activities in the Arctic region. A significant uptick in Chinese Arctic activity will create new security dilemmas for the United States and its allies, and could signal a significant change in the relationship between Russia and China, potentially affecting how NATO approaches the Russia threat in the Arctic.  

Risks

1. Overemphasis on Greenland risks underinvestment in Alaska. First, this plan calls for increased focus on securing the Arctic alongside Canada and European allies. The focus of this paper is on developing a productive path forward with regard to Greenland; as such, there is a limited focus on the US homeland. Pursuing this strategy without further investment in Alaska will likely prompt domestic political opposition and leave the United States vulnerable in a critical region for homeland defense and power projection to the Indo-Pacific.  
2. Ignoring Greenlanders’ concerns risks of alienating local Arctic communities. Though future investments in Greenland’s mining and military infrastructure might energize the local economy and bolster security, they also bring environmental consequences and could galvanize local political opposition. To gain local support, the United States and its allies should address the needs of local and indigenous communities through consultation and cooperation. Greenlanders emphasize “nothing about us without us,” and the United States can build goodwill in Greenland and across the Arctic by honoring this principle. 

Conclusion

Greenland’s future is of critical importance for the United States and its transatlantic allies. The challenge now is for Washington and its allies to chart a productive and comprehensive path forward to bolster security in Greenland and across the Arctic region. Effective implementation will require strong leadership from the executive branch, support from Congress, and the willingness of allies and partners to work together with Washington. A “defend, deny, deepen, and develop” framework can effectively deter adversaries in Greenland and the broader Arctic region, bolster cooperation with allies, and promote the responsible development of Arctic resources.

Atlantic Council Strategy Papers Editorial Board

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

The Scowcroft Center is grateful to Frederick Kempe and Alexander V. Mirtchev for their ongoing support of the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series in their capacity as executive editors.

About the Atlantic Council Task Force on Greenland

In the first quarter of 2026, the Atlantic Council convened a task force of experts to develop a US and allied strategy for Greenland. Input from a task force roundtable and subsequent peer review helped to inform this report. The task force members endorse the general thrust of the report while not necessarily agreeing with every sentence or recommendation.  

View the task force members

• Reed Blakemore, director, research and programs, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
• Justina Budginaite-Froehly, nonresident senior fellow, Europe Center; nonresident senior fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Debra Cagan, senior adviser, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
• John Deni, nonresident senior fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Phil Dickinson, deputy director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Daniel Fried, Weiser Family distinguished fellow, Atlantic Council
• Jörn Fleck, senior director, Europe Center, Atlantic Council
• Sherri Goodman, board director and distinguished fellow, Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative and Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Tressa Guenov, senior director, programs and operations and senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• John Herbst, senior director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
• Rich Hooker, senior fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Doug Jones, nonresident senior fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Matthew Kroenig, vice president, geostrategy and fellows and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Charles Lichfield, director, economic foresight and analysis and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council
• Marisol Maddox, nonresident senior associate, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Esther McClure, senior fellow, Transatlantic Defense and Security Program, Center for European Policy Analysis
• Julia Neshiewat, distinguished fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
• Stephen Shapiro, senior adviser, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• William Taylor, distinguished fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
• Kevin Whitaker, nonresident senior fellow, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council

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