A major strategic shift in the Indo-Pacific is happening quietly: China’s presence in seas and ports far from its coast is becoming routine. The frequency of its appearances has been rising for about a decade. Now it’s approaching a point where China’s military presence has become normal and expected, not aggressive.
This is another example of China’s familiar tactic of salami slicing, seen also, for example, in its progressive attempts at dominating the South China Sea: it takes a little, then a little more, and hopes eventually to have the whole salami.
Expect Chinese ships to keep turning up in waters near other Indo-Pacific countries with ever increasing frequency. Expect its ships to moor in their ports, too.
This outlook is based in part on ASPI war gaming in March that looked at how China’s defence and security agencies might extend influence between now and 2036.
Part of China’s goal is to dilute US influence in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Through incremental changes, China is moving from isolated, episodic appearances to a sustained footprint in these two oceans.
As its presence becomes more normal, its aggressive and illegal behaviour will attract less opposition. China’s persistent presence and great military power will be intended to have an increasingly coercive effect on how other Indo-Pacific powers, including Australia and Japan, respond to its aggression.
China’s far-seas strategy was prompted by expansion of its economic and energy interests far beyond its immediate waters. But the increasing presence of Chinese naval ships across the Indian and Pacific oceans indicates that China has moved to a two-ocean strategy, under which its fleets operate in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. This strategy got ‘a renewed relevance and momentum’ after the Belt and Road Initiative began in 2013. Execution of it is now more intensive.
So, expect China’s 2025 live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea to be replicated in the coming years elsewhere in the region and with rising frequency. Such exercises will send a message to India, Australia and others: standing in China’s way is risky.
But China’s efforts to normalise its military presence will continue to evolve in several ways. There are at least four additional aspects that should be noted.
First, the Chinese navy’s rest and recreation visits to ports in the region could evolve into rotational presence in which ships arrive regularly for resupply, in some places conducting surveillance and intelligence missions as they do. Medical diplomacy missions such as by the hospital ship Heping Fangzhou (Peace Ark) could lead to greater strategic benefits, deepening Chinese presence in the smaller and weaker states in the Indian and Pacific Ocean.
Second, the presence of Chinese surveillance and intelligence ships, falsely called research vessels, in the Indian and Pacific oceans may also become more regular. Ships such as those of the Dongdiao class are equipped with advanced radar and intelligence collection equipment. The more often they turn up, the more they will watch foreign military activities and exercises such as Talisman Sabre, a multinational drill led by Australia and the United States. China has already been sending such ships to monitor Indian rocket and missile launches and has probably been mapping ocean topography to support submarine operations. This will likely expand.
Third, China might expand the function of its dual-use and logistics facilities, as well as commercial ports in other countries, upgrading them from logistical functions to aiding naval and intelligence activities. China is also likely to establish many more such dual-use facilities in the Indian and Pacific oceans in the next 10 years.
Finally, the China Coast Guard will likely have a larger function in Beijing’s maritime strategy, which could see it engaging in extraterritorial law enforcement patrols in the Indian and Pacific oceans. China’s 2021 Coast Guard Law is already contrary to international law, an indication of how it the service behave further afield in coming years. China is likely to come up with new justifications for interventions in others’ territorial waters.
These manoeuvres need to be called out before they become routine and normalised. If they’re widely discussed now, Australia and its partners will better consider how to respond. Greater regional security diplomacy is needed to highlight the emerging danger and develop cooperative means to counter it. This cooperation may itself prove to be a deterrent that could convince Beijing to act more moderately. If not, such diplomacy can be the basis of stronger efforts to defend the region. But it begins with highlighting the dangers of normalising China’s military actions and presence in the region.
